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A BRIEF SURVEY, OF THE JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF
TIlE UNITED STATESS. By Charles W. Bunn.* (5th ed.) St. Paul: West Pub-
lishing Co., 1949. Pp. ix, 408. $4.00.
Although I knew the wide popularity of the earlier editions, I approached
examination of this little volume with considerable diffidence. I have come
to question the value of small books on big problems almost as much as
Professor Hays, who has said: - "All efforts to state law in a nutshell are
failures, because law is basically-a thing to be understood rather than merely
known."'- Was there chafice of -more success in the peculiarly difficult and
technical field of federal jurisdiction? My doubts' were not lessened by the
author's prefatory compliment to the clarity of the new revision of the Federal
Judicial Code and his statement that this book was constructed about that
revision. For the general value of that striking statutory accomplishment was
marred by ambiguities and confusions in draftsmanship which have already
required corrective measures.2 These were of the type which a small general-
ized treatise might overlook or minimize. Laudatory statements in this vein
might suggest the possibility of such a consequence here. But I am bound to
say that upon examination the book seems much better than I bad expected
and nearly, if not quite, all my doubts have been allayed.
First let me say that this seems to me a better book, more concise, more
forthright, and more complete than the earlier editions prepared by the present
author's father. True, there have been certain developments of importance, of
which the Rules of Civil Procedure and the new Code are outstanding, which
have brought some degree of symmetry into the subject and have thus sim-
plified the task of exposition. Nevertheless, the author displays an unusual
gift for condensation and for clarity of statement. The scope of the book
does not allow for much invention; but there is here and there a synthesis of
importance, leading to a suggestion for reform of substantial value. Of the
first is an analysis of the federal question ;' of the second is a recommenda-
tion for correction-by provisions for extension of venue and service of
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin.
1. Hays, Book Review, 46 COL. L. REv. 888 (1946).
2. As in the extensive and detailed act, Pub. L. No. 72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (May
24, 1949), amending Titles 18 and 28 U. S. C. The exigencies of the legislative process,
as exemplified in securing the adoption of so extensive, even monumental, an enactment,
may well explain, or go far to excuse, these blemishes; they should not, however, obscure
the facts as to the existence of the latter.
3. Pp. 26-30. -
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process--of the anomaly that indispensable parties may prevent any federal
jurisdiction whatsoever
4
If some lingering doubt does remain, it is only because the seriousness of
some of these problems does not lend itself easily to succinct statement-. Per-
haps as good an example as any is in connection with the troublesome question
of the final decision necessary to afford the basis for the general appellate
review. Only a short paragraph' covers this problem, which has called forth
so many pages of judicial and textual comment. First there is the quite
proper warning that "a surprising amount of difficulty" has been found in
determination of the question. Then the author risks a quotation from a
Supreme Court decision dealing with the not wholly analogous question of
certiorari from state court decisions, and goes on to say that "the general
proposition is clear enough," viz.: "To be final the judgment 'must end the
litigation by fully determining the rights of the parties' so that nothing remains
to be done except ministerial acts." This is supported by another reference to
a state case in the Supreme Court and followed by a citation of two obvious
examples of lack of finality-an order for a new trial and an order for judg-
ment for an amount to be determined later. That is all. There is no reference,
for example, to the various hesitant steps backward and forward of the courts,
including the Supreme Court, or to the hopes for greater clarity and certainty
now centered in the approach of the recent amendment to Rule 54(b).6 The
author has been careful and meticulous in the affirmative statements which
he ventures; but their very brevity, and all the negative implications which
may be read into them, leave the material wanting as a guide to the solution
of any but the simplest cases.
In the review referred to above,7 Professor Hays suggested that it was
impossible to imagine for whom the books then under review were "intended
or to whom they could be helpful." In our present case the answer is not so
doubtful. Clearly this is a volume of direct benefit to those who have some
sophistication in the field of law in general and already some knowledge that
federal procedure may contain pitfalls. Thus to the federal judge or practi-
tioner the volume is quite useful as a desk reminder of what he should and
probably does know if he has not overlooked some pertinent details. Likewise
4. Pp. 118, 119.
5. Pp. 189, 190.
6. See the discussion in the Advisory Committee's Report on the proposed amend-
ments, June 1946, pp. 70-72, also appearing in 28 U. S. C. foil. § 723c, 1949 Supp. Pamph.
559, and 5 F. R. D. 472, 473. I have discussed the recent cases considering the amend-
ment, with citation to the extensive law review material and the recent decision of Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 69 Sup. Ct. 1221 (1949), in my article, Experience under
the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Supplementary Note, appearing
in the 1950 Revised Edition, FEDERAL RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, of the West Pub-
lishing Company.
7. Note 1 supra.
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to the law student who may feel too pressed to give separate time to this field,
but who has enough background to take the author's warnings or signal flags
for at least all their worth, the book has its value. For on the whole it is a
rather amazing little volume in the amount of condensed information it does
convey to those whose minds are prepared to receive it with the proper balance.
But this very conciseness does place a responsibility upon the reader which
may make its proper audience a selected one, even among the profession.
If this is its utility, there is one difficulty it must face. That is the need
that it be kept meticulously up to date and that its laconic statements be kept
accurate as of the time of use. As noted above, the new Code here so praised
has been subject to needed corrections, already rendering out of date some of
the textual discussions. In fact, some confusions noted in the book have been
removed by the added legislation. An example is the problem whether or not
the omission from the Code of the former provision denying any appeal from
the remand back of a removed case meant that appeal was now permissible.
The author not unreasonably decided that it was.8 But the corrective act
shows that the earlier omission was an unintended error; and the provision
against appeal is now re-enacted. Other attempted corrections may prove
less successful. Thus our author points out'10 that by virtue of a new pro-
vision" the district court was commanded by a mandatory provision to transfer
a case brought to the wrong district to a district where the venue was proper.
This was an extensive change as to federal jurisdiction, with some things to
be said in its favor. But apparently it went further than the Revisers had
contemplated, for the amendment now provides that in the case of erroneous
venue the district court "shall dismiss or in the interest of justice shall
transfer" the case to the proper district. A simple and fairly direct provision
has given way to one without direct mandate of any kind. If the intent was
to leave the right to seek a federal court to the district judge's discretion, this
again illustrates the still constantly changing character of federal jurisdiction
and the difficulty of keeping up with it.
Perhaps in what I have said above I have expressed more doubt about
this little book than is justified on the record. Certainly in the past it appears
to have proved its value to a large circle of readers. Since the comparative
merits of this edition are so obvious, I should expect it to appeal to an even
wider circle. For what the author has planned to do he has done with an
8. P. 145.
9. Pub. L. No. 72, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., § 84 (May 24, 1949), amending Pub. L.
No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1447 (1948).
10. Pp. 120, 121.
11. Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948), 28 U. S. C. § 1406 (a)
(1948).
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effectiveness which I have found surprising. And I gladly report that it is the
best little book in a big field of which I know. It is probably ungracious to
ask for more than the author has planned.
CHARLES E. CLARKf
MEN AND MEASURES IN THE LAW. By Arthur T. Vanderbilt.* New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949. Pp. xxi, 156. $3.00.
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW: THE SEMANTICS OF FORENSIC ENGLISH.
By Frederick A. Philbrick. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1949.
Pp. ix, 254. $3.75.
LANGUAGE OF POLITICS: STUDIES IN QUANTITATIVE SEMANTICS. By
Harold D. Lasswell** and Associates. New York: George W. Stewart,
1949. Pp. 398. $5.75.
The goddess of justice may be blind, but she is certainly not mute. In-
deed, the complaint has often been lodged against her that she talks too much,
and (it .has been insinuated) she says too little. She might even be called
the garrulous goddess.
It is not recorded who lodged the first charge of verbosity against the
garrulous goddess, but there are records of some eminent and telling criticisms
of her language, or anyway that of her disciples. The history of real criticism
in this field begins, appropriately enough, in 1776. In that year Jeremy
Bentham (A Fragment on Government; etc.,) derided the stuffy conservatism
of Blackstone and the other conventional legal writers by gibing that "the
commonplace retinue of phrases," Justice, Right, Reason, the Law of Nature,
"are but so many ways of intimating that a man is firmly persuaded of the
truth of this or that moral proposition, though he either thinks he need not, or
finds he can't, tell why." We must distinguish, he said, between things and
names; "all else is but womanish scolding and childish altercation, which is
sure to irritate, and which never can persuade. . .. "
Although influential in some other respects, Bentham did not have much
immediate effect on that branch of legal thinking which modem scholars
would call "legal semantics." It was a century later that the commonplace
retinue of legal phrases and concepts was brilliantly satirized by Rudolph von
Jhering, a German professor of law, in his Heaven of Juristic Concepts.
About the same time our own Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., was beginning to
attack the formal verbalisms of traditional legal thinking with keen realistic
analysis. In 1913 he told a meeting of the Harvard Law School Association
of New York, "If I ffiay ride a hobby for an instant;-Ish6uld saywe need to
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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